Achieving Real Sustainability Through Much Lower Transport Fuel Use

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Presentation to the Windsor Workshop
Toronto, June 17, 2004

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What should be the main concerns of transport policy-makers?

- **Sustainability?** Yes. But it means different things to different people, often quite different; bridging the differences can be a huge challenge.

- **Kyoto?** Yes. But it’s hard to persuade Canadians that warmer winters will be a problem, or that they should prevent or prepare for sea-level rise in 2050.

- **Energy constraints?** Yes. It’s hardly on policy-makers’ radar, but signs of early—perhaps profound—impacts are clear. Energy concerns should be foremost in our policy-making and shape our approaches to sustainability and climate change.
Energy is IMPORTANT

- Without ample supplies of inexpensive added energy, modern civilization as we know it may not be possible.

- Our buildings would be hardly habitable, our transport arrangements would be primitive, and most of our worldly goods would be irreplaceable.

- The most profound impact could be on population, now sustained by energy-intensive agriculture and public health practices.

- Without energy slaves from one-time deposits of fossil fuels, our planet might support a billion ‘slaves to the soil’, rather than six billion humans often living in extraordinary comfort.
World discovery of and demand for oil and natural gas, 1900-2000, and projected potential demand until 2020

Billions of Oil-Equivalent Barrels

We haven’t been finding the fuel we need to sustain what we depend on. In this decade, we are using more natural gas than we are discovering, and very much more oil.

Source: Exxon Mobile Corporation
World production of regular oil by region, non-conventional oil, and natural gas liquids, actual and estimated, billions of barrels per year, 1930-2050

Production of crude oil and equivalents—which provide >95% of transport fuels worldwide, >99% in Canada—may peak in 2012, which will mean very high prices unless demand falls first.

Source: Uppsala Hydrocarbon Depletion Group
This month’s NG cover echoes the title of a 1998 *Scientific American* article by Colin Campbell and Jean Laherrère that was initially dismissed as yet another oil scare but is now seen as a seminal step in our understanding of the future of oil.
“The authors believe that their analysis has a bias toward optimism about oil resource availability because it does not attempt to incorporate political or environmental constraints on production, nor does it explicitly include geologic constraints on production rates.”
An Oil Enigma: Production Falls Even as Reserves Rise

By ALEX BERENSON

For six consecutive years, ChevronTexaco has had good news for anyone worried that the world is running out of oil: the company has found more oil and natural gas than it has produced. Over that time, ChevronTexaco’s proven oil and gas reserves have risen 14 percent, more than one billion barrels.

But near the bottom of ChevronTexaco’s financial filings is a much less promising statistic. For each of those years, ChevronTexaco’s wells have produced less oil and gas than the year before. Even as reserves have risen, the company’s annual output has fallen by almost 15 percent, and the declines have continued recently despite a company promise to increase production in 2002.

The usual focus on reserves seems misplaced. Reserves are important (although often questionable) but production—or rather, ability to produce—may be much more important.
Four points from the Danish paper
(at http://www.ida.dk/oilconference/Oil-based_Technology_and_Economy.pdf)

1. There will be a peak in world oil production.

2. If peak later than about 2020 is possible, which is far from clear, it will be achieved only by making huge investments, which may well be wasted.

3. An earlier peak will be “less unfortunate” for humanity than a later peak.

4. Governments should work to ensure that the peak in oil use occurs before the peak in oil production.
Government’s Kyoto plan would plateau oil use

- Kyoto looks more promising with EU backing of Russian accession to WTO.

- *The Climate Change Plan for Canada* appears to favour a plateauing of oil use by 2010, at about the 2001 level. (About 70% of Canada’s final oil use is for transport.)

- It would be relatively easy to refocus relevant policy to start pushing oil use down, within the Kyoto framework, so Canada becomes economically as well as environmentally sustainable.
Actions need for short, medium, and longer terms

- **Short-term** actions are the most important, to get oil use moving down before the oil production peak (in 2012?). A focus on trucks’ load factors may produce the biggest gains.

- **Medium-term** actions are required to keep pushing oil use down further after the peak (and to help in the short term). A focus on new-vehicle fuel consumption may produce the biggest gains.

- **Longer-term** actions are required to help reduce oil use much more, while maintaining mobility and advancing sustainability. For this, adoption of tethered vehicle systems may offer the best strategy.
Energy use for freight movement by truck in Canada grew >50% during 1990-2002. It fell for other freight movement, increased 16% for other transport and 17% for all other uses. (Population growth was about 14%.)

Trucking accounted for about 70% of Canada’s growth in oil use between 1990 and 2002.

Thus, reducing trucking’s oil use should be the short-term focus.

How fuel use per payload-tkm varies with load factor

2½ times as much fuel is required to move a tonne of payload over 100 km when a truck is ¼ full than when it is ¾ full.

Source: Based on data provided by Volvo Truck Corporation
Weighted average vehicle weight (left and engine power (right), light-duty vehicles sold in the U.S., 1975-2004 model years

Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2004

Note how all technology gain since mid-1980s has gone to 25% weight increase and to 76% increase in engine power. If weight and power had remained the same, fuel use would be 55% lower (5.1 vs. 11.3 L/100km).
What are tethered vehicles?

- They are electrically driven vehicles that get their motive energy from an overhead wire or wires (or third rail) rather than from an on-board source.

- They have high ‘wire-to-wheel’ fuel efficiency for four reasons:
  - >95% of applied energy is converted to traction
  - electric motors are intrinsically lighter than ICEs
  - constant torque at all speeds means no oversizing
  - there is no fuel to carry.

- Overall efficiency and environmental impacts depend on the distribution system (perhaps a 10% loss) and the primary fuel source, which can range from inefficient and dirty (e.g., coal) to efficient and clean (e.g., wind).

- Tethered systems can use a wide range of fuels and switch among them without disrupting transport activity, making for smooth transitions towards sustainable transportation.
Public transit within cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vehicle type</th>
<th>Fuel</th>
<th>Occupancy (pers./veh.)</th>
<th>Energy use (mJ/pkm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transit bus (U.S.)</td>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trolleybus (U.S.)</td>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light rail (streetcar)</td>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy rail (subway)</td>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Montreal

Calgary

Vancouver
Public transit between cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vehicle type</th>
<th>Fuel</th>
<th>Occupancy (pers./veh.)</th>
<th>Energy use (mJ/pkm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercity rail</td>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School bus</td>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercity bus</td>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercity rail</td>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amtrak Acela at Boston South station

German ICE
### Personal vehicles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vehicle type</th>
<th>Fuel</th>
<th>Occupancy (pers./veh.)</th>
<th>Energy use (mJ/pkm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUVs, vans, etc.</td>
<td>Gasoline</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>3.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large cars</td>
<td>Gasoline</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>2.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small cars</td>
<td>Gasoline</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>2.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>Gasoline</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel-cell car</td>
<td>Hydrogen</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid electric car</td>
<td>Gasoline</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very small car</td>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Rapid Transit</td>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Freight transport

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vehicle type</th>
<th>Fuel</th>
<th>Energy use (mJ/tkm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truck</td>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train</td>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train</td>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck</td>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>0.15?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trolley truck operating at the Quebec Cartier iron ore mine, Lac Jeannine, 1970s
Tethered vehicles and the next transport revolution (1)

- The main contexts for the next transport revolution could be super-high oil prices and little in the way of availability of hydrogen or uses for it.

- The main transport concerns will be (i) getting the most movement for the least energy use; (ii) taking advantage of the widest possible range of energy sources.

- Much more than other systems, tethered vehicle systems meet both of these needs.

- We should invest now in rails, wires, and other infrastructure for tethered vehicles. Sustaining our transport-dependent way of life may well depend on it.
Tethered vehicles and the next transport revolution (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Era</th>
<th>Approximate dates</th>
<th>What drives wheels</th>
<th>What provides electricity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Steam Age</td>
<td>1820-1890</td>
<td>External combustion engine</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1\textsuperscript{st} Electric Age</td>
<td>1890-1910</td>
<td>Electric motor (EM)</td>
<td>Battery, tether</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICE Age</td>
<td>1910-2010</td>
<td>Internal combustion engine (ICE)</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid Age</td>
<td>2010-2020</td>
<td>ICE and EM (or EM alone)</td>
<td>Battery charged by ICE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2\textsuperscript{nd} Electric Age</td>
<td>2020-??</td>
<td>Electric motor</td>
<td>Fuel cell, battery, tether</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the fuel cell doesn’t become a practicable choice for road vehicles—because of too high costs of vehicles, refuelling infrastructure, and fuel—the primary challenge could be to develop tethered systems that provide the convenience of today’s personal vehicles and trucks.
Meanwhile, we face the perfect cost storm

- In 2004, three kinds of transport cost are rising or are set to rise to unprecedented levels:
  - fuel costs, even before the production peak, because of the increased share of non-conventional oil;
  - emission-control costs—vehicles and fuels—because of dramatically more rigorous standards coming into effect;
  - security costs, more for public transport modes (bus, rail, air), and for freight (all modes).

- In the U.S. (and elsewhere?), transport-related final demand’s share of total GDP has been extraordinarily constant, at least since 1980, varying only between 10.4% and 11.3%.

- Will the cost storm cause transport’s share of GDP to rise? If so, what other activity will fall? Or, will the constancy continue? If so, how will transport activity fall?